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A B S T R A C T
The integration of resilience in disaster management is an emerging field as evidenced by an abundant literature.
While resilience has been widely explored in several domains, its application demands the consideration of the
entire ecosystem and its lifecycle, including disaster stressors and consequences, recovery process, and ulti-
mately the prevention phase. In this paper, a qualitative characterization of resilience for buildings on an urban
scale of analysis is achieved throughout the conduct of a Delphi-based expert consultation. The aim is to elicit
and validate relevant criteria to characterize the resilience of our built-environment in face of geo-environmental
hazards through two phases of consultation involving 23 and 21 respondents, respectively. The initial set of
criteria consisted of 40 indicators, increasing to 48 at the end of the survey. The different criteria are clustered
into seven categories, ranging from environmental to socio-organizational and technical. The results from both
rounds of consultation were then analysed by means of statistical analysis with MATLAB and discussed for each
category. The preliminary version of the framework for buildings’ resilience assessment on an urban scale is
presented with a final set of 43 validated criteria.
1. Introduction
The extensive disaster resilience research points to the increasing
frequency in natural hazards and their worldwide consequences [1,2].
For instance, several countries in 2017 have endured devastating
storms and hurricanes with dramatic human and financial losses [3].
Conversely, floods have hit several regions in Europe and China with
sizeable consequences on human settlements, harvests and crops [3].
In response to these threats, researchers have developed a wide
range of methods, strategies, tools and techniques in response to dis-
aster preparedness, mitigation and recovery needs. A key milestone in
disaster mitigation was reached in the 2005 World Conference on
Disaster reduction (WCDR) [4]. This paved the way to a plethora of
research aimed at the integration of resilience as well as hazard pre-
paredness strategies in disaster management. A positivist philosophical
stance has then been adopted, focussing on how to enhance resilience as
opposed to reducing risks, although the relationship between vulner-
ability and resilience remains blurred [5]. The United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) published several reports advocating
a more inclusive approach towards resilience and its integration into
disaster management strategies [6–8]. UNISDR also engaged in wide
resilience-enhancing strategies, such as the Make My City Resilient tool
[8,9], aimed at integrating urban development with disaster risk re-
duction.
A common drawback across different disruptions is that buildings
and infrastructures experience significant damages after geo-environ-
mental hazards, with the death toll continuously in the rise [10]. Poor
construction quality can exacerbate the level of disruption due to the
collapse of structures, putting at risk a higher amount of lives and
amplifying the effects of the hazard itself. For this reason, the last
decade has seen a steady growth in interdisciplinary resilience research
applied across building engineering disciplines. However, the concept
of resilience is not novel since its nature and applicability have been
widely debated over time [11–13] and can concisely be defined as a
systems’ capacity to exhibit an acceptable level of performance after
undergoing a disruptive event. More recently, resilience has attracted
interest in the scientific domain as numerical formulations for its as-
sessment were developed in different domains of engineering, such as
structures [14], infrastructures [15], or networked systems [16]. The
concept of resilience is also being integrated in risk management
planning [17,18] to address safety considerations and the ability of
recovering from a disruption. This applies widely to every type of ha-
zard, including both natural hazards and other types of threats such as
terrorism.
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The body of research addressing resilience broadly involves dif-
ferent levels and domains of action. Frameworks with the widest per-
spective generally address the urban context in its entirety in face of a
wide range (i.e., generic) types of hazards [19–22], while more specific
formulations can refer to the resilience of a single element (e.g., a
building) in face of a specific threat (e.g., seismic hazard) [23,24].
Several resilience frameworks, such as the ones devised by Chang [25]
and Labaka [26], refer to the TOSE conceptualization of resilience
proposed by Bruneau et al. [27], including the four dimensions of re-
silience, namely: Technical, Organizational, Social and Economical.
McDaniels et al. also deal with the topic of critical infrastructures (CIs)
but addressing resilience from a management and organizational
standpoint [28]. Labaka proposes instead a framework to nurture re-
silience of CIs employing a Delphi consultation [26], which makes it of
relevance for the proposed research. Moreover, Labaka addresses resi-
lience policies and their effectiveness while applied on CIs manage-
ment. After identifying the main resilience dimensions (i.e., TOSE), a
set of resilience policies are identified and their influence on different
stages of resilience (i.e., prevention, absorption and recovery) is as-
sessed based on a Delphi consultation. From a more focussed perspec-
tive at the single building level, Cimellaro and Bruneau provided their
contribution in relation to seismic structural resilience of healthcare
buildings [14,24,29,30]. Uzielli proposed a methodology to numeri-
cally assess the structural resilience of buildings in landslide prone-
areas based on a multi-domain mapping [31].
A wider scale of analysis is encompassed instead in the work by
Cutter et al. [22], proposing the ‘disaster resilience of place’ (DROP)
framework which features the assessment of resilience through a set of
six categories and relative indicators. However, the targeted application
of this framework remains blurred, and therefore, it is not clear how the
different indicators can be combined in order to achieve a concrete
assessment. Similarly, the frameworks devised by Arup [19] and Bur-
oHappold Engineering [20] contributed to foster the development of
urban-scale resilience assessment. The improvements provided by these
frameworks consist in the comprehensive perspective of urban centres'
resilience when affected by various types of disruptions that can vary
from earthquakes to epidemics. Although sharing an objective similar
to Cutter's framework [22], Da Silva [19] and Field [20] research is
underpinned by a more robust methodology where indicators can be
measured and clearly factorized.
World-scale organizations such as UNISDR are also involved in
fostering resilience as exemplified by the Hyogo Framework for Action
(HFA) [4]. The HFA consists of a milestone for disaster management
strategies, advocating the achievement of communities’ resilience
through the integration of sustainable development and Disaster Risk
Reduction (DRR) policies. In addition, it fosters a stronger support to
institutions and strategies for ensuring safety while informing disaster
preparedness. Innocenti and Albrito [4] also highlight how the concept
of “adaption” has been nurtured following to the Fourth Report re-
leased by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [32].
In light of the above, it is evident that while resilience is attracting
considerable interdisciplinary research, urban-scale studies addressing
resilience from the perspective of buildings and infrastructures, in face
of natural hazards, is limited. Moreover, existing approaches either
address a broad scale of analysis (e.g., urban level) or target a very
specific domain (e.g., structural resilience on a single building level). In
our view, existing research initiatives addressing urban-scale resilience
[19,20] overlook relevant aspects of technical resilience (e.g., struc-
tures and infrastructures features), prioritizing socio-organizational
factors. Conversely, detailed approaches for resilience quantification at
the building level, such as the ones proposed by Cimellaro et al. and
previously described in Refs. [14,24,29], are hardly applicable on an
urban scale as these require sizeable computational work.
In order to address this gap, this research proposes a framework for
the assessment of the built environment (i.e., buildings and infra-
structures) resilience in face of geo-environmental hazards which in-
cludes both a qualitative evaluation and a quantitative approach [1].
The framework is grounded on the need for a scalable and concretely
applicable resilience strategy that can address both levels of analysis
(i.e., urban and building levels). Given that the proposed methodology
is building agnostic (i.e., independent from building-specific features),
its potential for application can range across different structural and
building typologies. The quantitative dimension of the framework en-
compasses the structural assessment as a method to investigate the
building's capacity to endure a specific disruption. Conversely, the
qualitative approach integrates policy-making and disaster-manage-
ment strategies that impact on the buildings' performance beyond their
mere structural behaviour but in the context of a whole urban system.
Following this introduction, chapter 2 presents the methodology
that underpins the research. Chapter 3 elaborates on the Framework
structure design and its constituent dimensions. This is followed by
chapter 3 that presents the results of the Delphi consultation, followed
by a discussion (chapter 6) of the consensus-based framework for urban
resilience assessment with its 48 criteria developed across seven do-
mains. Chapter 7 concludes the paper and provides directions for future
research.
2. Methodology
Fig. 1 shows a schematic of the methodology adopted for the pro-
posed expert consultation, which was carried out in two rounds be-
tween November 2017 and August 2018. First, a literature review has
been carried out in order to gather a set of representative criteria and
dimensions to characterize resilience from the perspective of the built
environment. This particular step has been achieved through the ana-
lysis of existing frameworks and it is thoroughly described in section 3.
Next, the objective was to validate the identified indicators using a
Delphi consultation process. A Delphi-based validation offers the ad-
vantage of factoring in different views from relevant experts in fields of
interest within a specified time frame. This is particularly beneficial to
account for the complexity of the domain of building resilience. Experts'
feedbacks in relation to a particular topic are collected throughout
Fig. 1. Delphi consultation methodology.
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different rounds of consultation [33]. The Delphi methodology has a
consistent and supporting body of research as it has been widely im-
plemented in different fields. Ameyaw et al. [34] provided an extensive
overview of different applications in the construction engineering and
management domain. However, existing research adopting Delphi
methodologies focus on socio-organizational assessment of resilience or
target the community in its entirety, hence not focussing on buildings
and infrastructures. As an example, Alsheri et al. [21] pursued a socio-
organizational assessment of resilience at the community level, char-
acterized through socio-economic factors, whereas Labaka's work [26]
revolved around the application of resilience management strategies.
2.1. Delphi expert consultation
The Delphi methodology consists in an iterative process involving
the execution of two [35,36] or more rounds [37,38] adopted to collect
feedback from experts in a specific domain and in relation to a targeted
topic. In the context of this consultation, a panel of experts is elicited in
relation to a series of statements to provide a score representing the
perceived relevance based on the expert's personal professional back-
ground. This methodology has been widely employed in research to
anonymously collect judgment from geographically spread experts
when it is acceptable to get results in a longer timeline [39]. Past re-
search initiatives praise the advantages of this methodology, high-
lighting four points, namely: (a) experts' anonymity; (b) the experts are
allowed to change their opinion after each round completion; (b) the
provision of feedback allows the communication of the outcomes of the
previous round; (d) a statistical analysis of the final responses achieves
a comprehensive consideration of each experts' feedback [21,40–42].
2.1.1. Panel of experts
As highlighted by Adler and Ziglio [43], the experts that eventually
compose the panel need to (a) show willingness to take part in the
survey, (b) be in possession of expertise relevant to the specific domain,
(c) be able to allocate the necessary time in order to provide a suitable
feedback, and (d) provide their opinion in an appropriate way relying
on effective communication skills.
It is worth noting that the panel of experts can vary according to the
targeted research, as illustrated in Table 1. The lack of a commonly
agreed expert panel size has been discussed in the literature [37,44,45]
arguing that this can be explained by a wide range of reasons, including
time constraints and project objectives. Conversely, Witkins and Alt-
schuld [46] recommend a panel size lower than 50 and Clayton [47]
distinguishes between homogeneous and heterogeneous panels com-
posed respectively by experts from the same or different domains of
expertise. Authors such as Alsheri et al. [21] started with a panel
composed by 71 experts. However, only 40 completed the three rounds.
Regarding the research carried out by Labaka [26] in relation to the CIs’
resilience, only 15 experts over 21 completed the entire Delphi process.
Based on the above, and considering that the acceptance rate will in-
evitably be lower than the initial number of solicited experts, a
minimum of 50 experts were contacted to provide a richer and holistic
dataset of responses.
The experts were selected based on a review of the natural hazards
resilience literature [1]. Additional experts were identified in the same
institutions of this initial group of experts. Research institutes dealing
with disaster management (e.g., seismic and geo-environmental ha-
zards) have been considered as well as consulting companies and uni-
versities in order to create a comprehensive panel of experts with a
view to gather interdisciplinary expertise. The combination of experts
from different fields provides the advantage to consider problems from
different viewpoints. The initial panel has also been enriched by the
involvement of experts from China and United Kingdom who are col-
laborating with the authors in the context of a project aimed at in-
vestigating and improving resilience in the Wenchuan territory in China
after the 2008 seismic event (please see acknowledgement section).
With regard to the experts from China, a focused group was organized
and a paper version of the questionnaire was distributed in two separate
rounds. To this regard, Table 2 provides a breakdown of the experts’
domain of expertise based on the respondents involved in the two
rounds of consultation.
Overall, the initial panel of experts was composed of 70 people from
18 countries with different professional backgrounds. Out of the ap-
pointed experts, 23 completed the first round while 21 accepted to
provide their feedback also for the second round. Table 3 provides a
geographic breakdown of the initial panel of experts and the re-
spondents after the first and second round of consultation. Table 4 il-
lustrates instead the distribution by domain of the initial experts and
those who remained after the first and second rounds. As it can be as-
certained from Table 4, there is a predominance of experts in the aca-
demic domain that remained after the first round. However, a more
balanced distribution is achieved in the second round with the per-
centage of Academics dropping to 38%.
The experts have been informed either by email or in person about
the purpose of the research and the implications of a Delphi consulta-
tion. In addition, it has been highlighted that their anonymity would
Table 1
Characteristics of different Delphi methodologies.
Reference Scale type Initial panel size Final respondents
Alsheri 2015 5-point Likert 71 40
Labaka 2016 5-point Likert 21 15
Elmer 2010 6-point bipolar 55 45
Jordan 2013 5-point scale 12 11
Table 2
Distribution of experts by domain of expertise.
Domain of expertise After 1st round After 2nd round
Earthquake engineering 3 2
Geotechnical engineering 4 4
Urban planning and sustainability 1 1
Geology and risk assessment 11 11
Multi-hazard and reliability analysis 2 1
Urban, social and environmental resilience 1 1
Geotechnical and earthquake engineering 1 1
TOTAL 23 21
Table 3
Geographic distribution of experts across the Delphi consultation rounds.
Country Initial panel of
experts
% After 1st
Round
After 2nd
Round
Italy 17 24 2 1
United Kingdom 16 23 4 4
USA 12 17 4 3
China 7 10 7 7
Norway 3 4 1 1
Germany 3 4 0 0
Colombia 1 1 1 1
New Zealand 1 1 0 0
Spain 1 1 0 0
Austria 1 1 1 1
Slovenia 1 1 0 0
Netherlands 1 1 1 1
Saudi Arabia 1 1 1 1
Greece 1 1 0 0
Turkey 1 1 0 0
Iran 1 1 0 0
Canada 1 1 0 0
France 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 70 23 21
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have been guaranteed as a fundamental part of the process. The invited
experts have also been informed about the approximate duration of the
survey that has been kept under 20min. The survey has been conducted
using two different strategies between the first and second round. Given
the size of the initial panel, the formerly Bristol Online Survey (BOS)
and current Online Survey tool has been employed (https://www.
onlinesurveys.ac.uk/) for the first round. However, excel forms have
been adopted instead in the second round to factor in the consultation
results (e.g., previous response) from the first round for each re-
spondent individually.
2.1.2. Delphi rounds
Research evidence suggests that the higher the amount of rounds,
the lower response rate is achieved [37]. Dalkey et al. [48] observe that
the higher accuracy in terms of responses is obtained with two-round
Delphi consultations, since usually respondents tend to drop out after
that two iterations. With respect to the use of a suitable score-assign-
ment scale, Table 1 indicates that a 1–5 point Likert scale (1= not
relevant, 5=most important) obtained the higher consent [21,49,50].
Prior to the formal consultation, a trial round has been carried out
within the authors' research group to gather feedbacks from re-
searchers, academics (including professors) and PhD students. Fig. 1
highlights the systematic update of new rounds of consultation thanks
to the feedback provided in the previous ones. This has been attained by
allowing experts to write comments or amendments to indicators, as
well as proposing new ones. The same format was adopted for the Q&A
session during the focus group with the Chinese experts’ delegation, as
elaborated in section 3.1.1. No conversation was allowed to avoid bias
in the survey results. In this context, the questionnaire was handed over
to the experts and completed manually; and after each round, the ex-
perts were given the chance of establishing a discussion aimed at
achieving the consensus necessary to carry out the ensuing survey
stage.
2.1.3. Consensus
In order to move from one round to the following, it is necessary to
establish when an acceptable level of consensus amongst the feedbacks
has been achieved. Several consensus measurement strategies are
available in the literature [51]. However, according to Murphy et al.
[52], the most reliable way of defining consensus is the interquartile
range (IQR) index. Rayens et al. [53] argue that an IQR≤20% of the
rating scale is considered to be a good level of consensus. Therefore,
based on a rating scale composed of 5 points, an IQR ≤1 means that the
consensus achieved is in a suitable threshold, with 0 corresponding to
the strongest value, while the closer it gets to 1, the lower the consensus
will be. The standard deviation is used instead as an indicator of the
dispersion of the dataset, hence the higher it is, the more scattered are
the experts’ responses [54]. According to Goldman et al. [55], standard
deviation values greater than 1.5 correspond to a lower consensus.
Based on the work by Greatorex and Dexter [54], mean values are
considered as a valid pointer for the importance of the different in-
dicators.
There is a debate as to when to stop a Delphi methodology, and
based on which assumption. This is discussed in section 4.8. However,
the literature does not provide absolute recommendations, while re-
ferring to the “hierarchical stopping criteria” [51] devised by Dajani
et al. [56]. The later states that the achievement of the consensus itself
(i.e., IQR indicator) is not sufficient to be considered as a stopping
criterion, as significant fluctuations might occur between the rounds,
and therefore stability is a more reliable concept. This can be assessed
as described by English and Kernan [57] by means of the adoption of
the Variation Coefficient which entails the calculation of the ratio be-
tween the standard deviation and mean across all the criteria. This
indicator provides a tangible measure of the stability of the system as it
advocates that if the difference between the variation coefficients be-
tween the two rounds is not significant, it is possible to terminate the
process.
The analysis of results has been conducted initially with three dif-
ferent software in order to compare the results, namely Statistical
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), MATLAB and Excel. However,
MATLAB has been retained as the definitive analysis tool.
3. Framework structure design
This section describes the process behind the development of the
framework and its structure. In line with other resilience approaches
[19–21], the framework is structured into a series of criteria which are
further grouped into categories according to their topic. Both criteria
and categories were identified based on the literature review and en-
riched with the authors’ experience in the fields of analysis.
Seven categories have been identified based on the review of ex-
isting frameworks for resilience assessment. Some of these frameworks
[19–21] adopt a holistic perspective to community resilience in face of
disruptions with a comprehensive approach that does not just address
the physical domain but also the human aspects. Burton [58] highlights
a persistent set of categories that recur in resilience-related studies and
that can be similarly found in the other analysed frameworks with slight
adaptations since some aspects might be differently grouped. For in-
stance, “health & wellbeing” does not appear as a main category in the
framework devised by Field et al. [20], although it is considered as a
subcategory in the “society & community” one.
Table 5 provides an overview of the above-mentioned categories
highlighting how the current framework partially shares the view of
existing research, but at the same time introducing new elements while
leaving out others, which are not functional for the purpose of the
analysis. In fact, while the other studies mostly address resilience from
an urban standpoint, the current research, in particular, focuses on the
resilience of the built environment in the urban context. Therefore, the
proposed framework partially shares the existing structure from the
state-of-the-art, while also bringing in new embodiments to specifically
consider the implications of hazardous events on the built environment.
Four categories are thus shared by all the approaches, namely: gov-
ernance, economy, infrastructures and environment. Specifically, in
relation to the economic aspect, it is explicitly mentioned in the work of
Alshehri [21] and Da Silva [19], while it is considered as part of the
category “Business & Trade” in Field et al. [20].
With respect to the features of the proposed framework that dis-
tinguish it from the others, it is possible to consider for instance the
involvement of urban morphology and how it can affect the assessment
of the impact of a natural hazard. Godshalk [59], for instance, thor-
oughly discusses how there is a call for more compact urban systems to
foster resilience, although some maintain that dispersed frameworks
might be more advantageous in face of specific disruptions. The
aforementioned category therefore accounts for specific indicators
Table 4
Distribution of experts by professional background.
Domain Initial panel % After 1st round % After 2nd round %
Academia 37 53 10 43 8 38
Independent research institutes 21 30 8 35 8 38
Consultancy and Industry 12 17 5 22 5 24
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characterizing urban features such as: sprawl, density, elevation and
distribution of urbanized lands. Burby et al. [60] also argue that urban
containment policies might not be always effective to prevent ha-
zardous events to spread, implying that urban planning has an impact
on the vulnerability of inhabited areas. This category is also embedded
in the review carried out by Sharifi and Yamagata [61] regarding the
resilience of urban energy supply networks, highlighting how urban
morphology significantly influences the access to energy and its dis-
tribution in case of disruption. More recently, urban morphology has
been addressed more dynamically and organically, with the develop-
ment of strategies that actively integrate resilience with spatial mor-
phology and urban ecology, such as the work devised by Marcus and
Colding [62]. Similarly, Dhar and Khirfan propose a framework for
resilient development of urban contexts in face of climate change [63]
based on the panarchy model proposed by Gunderon and Holling [64]
for ecological systems.
Utility services are explicitly included given their impact on an
urban system's resilience, including all the networks developed for the
provision of energy and water supplies. Diversification of energy supply
sources, water and energy autonomy as well as availability of back up
energy sources are all considered in this category. The infrastructural
domain constitutes a vital aspect of resilience and a whole body of
research is already in place showing its relevance [26,65,66]. As a
matter of fact, infrastructures allow the establishment of physical
connections between urban centres and allow rescue services to access
the disrupted areas. Situations like the aftermath of the 2008 seismic
event in Beichuan (Wenchuan region in China), led to the isolation of
the city preventing emergency rescue services to access the area and
hence preventing thousands of people from being rescued. In order to
avert these occurrences, health-monitoring systems have to be put in
place on CIs and this aspect is also accounted for in the current cate-
gory.
With respect to common categories, a more detailed explanation
will be provided to contextualize them in the proposed framework.
Firstly, the category named “Environment” encompasses the vulner-
ability of the system addressing the hazard-related features (e.g., hazard
return period) as well as properties of the surroundings (e.g., soil ty-
pology). As elaborated in the following section, and to avoid duplica-
tion in case a hazard assessment of the area is already available, some of
the indicators included therein can be omitted while applying the fra-
mework. “Governance & Planning” accounts for the potential presence
and application of prevention, mitigation and recovery strategies. The
“Economic” category encompasses instead the ability of the local
economy of sustaining the costs of recovery, potentially relying also on
NGOs or international aids. In the following subsections, the different
dimensions are thoroughly analysed and discussed highlighting the
underlying reasons driving the choice of the different criteria.
3.1. Environment
Environmental awareness aims to build forward-looking strategies
to soften the impact of the hazard and promptly recover from it. It
entails a deep knowledge of the surroundings, including the natural
environment as well as the exposure and vulnerability of the area,
providing an overview of the potential threats in order to foster pre-
paredness.
The first selected indicator is the potential occurrence of simulta-
neous disruptions, since multi-hazard scenarios produce higher losses
because they challenge the vulnerability of the system on several as-
pects. Related to it, the geographical scale of the hazard needs to be
taken into account given its strong influence in terms of prevention,
mitigation and recovery planning.
In order to define an indicator that is able to take into account the
hazard in a specific area, it should be necessary to characterize three
main elements: magnitude of the event, spatial, and temporal mea-
surements [67]. Specifically in relation to earthquakes, a clear dis-
tinction has to be made between the definition of hazard and risk. The
first is defined as “the probabilistic measure of ground shaking asso-
ciated with the recurrence of earthquakes” [68], whereas risk involves
the potential damage that might occur to the population when a certain
hazard is involved. Generally, risk is defined as the combination of
hazard, exposure and vulnerability [69]. For the purpose of this re-
search, and more specifically seismic solicitations, the hazard is in-
vestigated given that the final framework should address the resilience
of the physical built environment system (i.e., buildings and infra-
structures). To this regard, the likelihood of occurrence of a specific
scenario [70] in probabilistic terms is equivalently expressed by means
of the return period. With respect to geo-hazards, such as rock falls or
landslides, their forecasting is not straightforward. Tsunamis instead,
can be strongly related to the occurrence of an earthquake and crustal-
deformation monitoring can contribute to the hazard forecasting [71].
Hazard forecasting is in general hard to achieve and perhaps the ones
about which we have the best estimation are earthquakes, but generally
the prediction is associated to a probabilistic approach based on his-
torical data.
Additionally, vulnerability, exposure and local amplification factors
were listed as indicators for this specific category. Vulnerability gen-
erally accounts for the likelihood of undergoing a certain level of da-
mage while affected by a disruptive event of given magnitude. When
dealing with natural hazards, the vulnerability usually applies to the
physical system, hence structures and infrastructures. Therefore, in-
dicators related to the maintenance level are particularly relevant given
that a poor maintenance negatively affects the resistance of the struc-
ture even prior to the hazard occurrence. This is also related to local
standards and in-effect regulations. Local amplification factors, such as
a high acidity rate in rainfall water or pollution [72], are strongly da-
maging for buildings and infrastructures.
Table 5
Categories in existing resilience frameworks and correlation with the proposed one.
Proposed framework Alsheri et al., 2015 Field et al., 2016 Da Silva, 2016 Burton, 2012 Cutter et al., 2008
Scale of analysis
Urban Community Community/urban Community/urban Community Community
Categories
Environment Natural/ecological Ecological
Governance & Planning Governance Governance & Economy Leadership & Strategy Institutional Institutional
Utility Services
Infrastructures Physical & Environmental Environment & Infrastructure Infrastructure & Ecosystems Infrastructural Infrastructure
Emergency & Rescue systems
Economy Economic Economy & Society Economic Economic
Land use & urban morphology
Community
Information & Communication Community competence
Health & Wellbeing Health & Wellbeing
Social Society & Community Social Social
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Giardini [68] includes date and time of the seismic event as a vul-
nerability factor for seismic risk evaluation. However, these factors are
difficult to include given the high uncertainty implied and the scale of
analysis. For the purpose of resilience, it is not necessary to include the
magnitude of the event as an indicator, given that the return period is
already a flag for the hazard intensity.
The intensity of a given hazardous event is a fundamental indicator
to be assessed in relation to the resilience of a specific site. Prior to the
description of the aforementioned indicator, a clarification has to be
made between the indicator “intensity” and the definition of intensity
provided in relation to earthquakes, which is different from the concept
of magnitude too. In this instance, intensity applies to a qualitative
assessment of the hazardous event and its scale has been inferred from
the mostly employed magnitude or intensity scales for the different
typologies of natural hazards, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, floods,
tsunamis. The modified Mercalli scale, for instance, adopts intensity
whereas Richter measures the magnitude.
Moreover, it is necessary to consider site-specific features that can
affect the integrity of the urban system and lead to secondary effects
triggered by the main hazard. Amongst these features, it is possible to
include for instance soil properties, general weather conditions and
exposure to snow and adverse weather conditions. The presence of
potential mappings of the ground is also investigated, being of primary
importance for structures and infrastructure design but also for the
assessment of the vulnerability of the site. To this regard, it has to be
highlighted that where a previous hazard assessment has already been
done and is regularly updated, indicators from 1.1 to 1.12 can be ne-
glected to avoid duplications.
3.2. Governance & Planning
This category accounts for the implementation of preventive mea-
sures put in place by governmental institutions and the strategies
adopted to cope with hazard occurrence. Moreover, this directly applies
to the “scale of hazard governance strategies”, meaning the geographic
extent of hazard prevention or recovery policies in place. These can
include for instance immediate post-disaster assessments, relocation of
people in the aftermath of a disaster or even allocation of resources for
countermeasures and reconstruction. To this regard, it is meaningful to
evaluate the scale of the plans devised by local governments, which is
also strengthened in other frameworks for resilience management
[19,61].
The second indicator of this category applies to the compliance to
the existing regulatory landscape, which is of primary importance as it
informs building planning, thus preventing unauthorized constructions
often located in hazardous areas with a higher vulnerability.
Furthermore, the regulatory landscape usually accounts for the specific
vulnerability of specific zones, for instance areas located close to rivers
or coasts; it is therefore, vital to be considered in this assessment.
The presence of data sensing strategies is also fostered by Sharifi
and Yamagata [61], consisting in a useful tool for technical figures to
inform governmental institutions in order to produce highly accurate
hazard assessments. As an example, data sensing is of primary im-
portance when it comes to the stability assessment of slopes prone to
landslides. This technology is highly implemented in China for early
warning systems.
Ultimately, education helps younger generations to develop sensi-
tivity to, and understanding of, hazard-related matters. A higher
awareness of the vulnerability of existing buildings and different hazard
typologies, as well as regular training, can foster prompter reactions
when the hazard occurs.
3.3. Utility services
Utility services include energy and water provision networks and
their management strategies in case of disruption. This accounts for the
urban capacity of providing energy and water coverage even in case the
city finds itself isolated as a consequence of an infrastructural failure.
Energy and water autonomy demand fundamental requirements [61].
Da Silva argue about the importance of “adequate continuity for critical
assets and services” [19]. Field [20] simply embeds utility services into
the “resources” category. The set of building –related indicators pre-
sented in this section, such as water discharge systems, energy provi-
sion, and telecommunications, have to be suitably incorporated to both
new and existing structures. This requires careful planning as well as a
comprehensive state of the art assessment of existing buildings.
As the concept of resilience applies to before, during and after the
disaster, an urban centre has to be provided with systems in place
suitable to ensure continuity of energy provision in order to overcome
the disruption effects that can potentially delay emergency services.
This applies to water, telecommunications and electricity, with an
emphasis on the concepts of redundancy and diversification of energy
sources or generation strategies [61]. This can be achieved through the
diversification of fuels or generation strategies for energy production.
The importance of redundancy has also been highlighted by Sharifi [73]
by applying this concept not only to energy stocks but also to infra-
structures and connections.
Another interesting approach to this topic is provided by Roege
et al. [74], who devise a matrix of indicators for the assessment of re-
silience in the context of energy systems. Of prominent interest is their
proposal for a functional redundancy metric, which turns out to be
significant, especially in the occurrence of hazards that jeopardize en-
ergy provisions. Roege et al. thus devised a 7 points-based scale which
qualifies the functional redundancy of a system, defined as “the ability
of functionally similar elements to partly or fully substitute for each
other” [74].
Telecommunication systems include for instance Internet, mobile
and cable lines. In order to assess the resilience of telecommunication
systems in case of disruption, the proposed indicator should be able to
assess the level of integration of technologies that can be independent
from potential damages resulting from natural hazards. Therefore, sa-
tellite systems would probably represent the most reliable tele-
communication technology. Nonetheless, satellite telecommunication
systems can hardly be found in at-risk areas, and for this reason it could
be more convenient to invest in the redundancy of network systems. In
this manner, users could easily rely on back up communication systems
in the occurrence of a break down [75].
In order to avoid chain failure of electric systems, circuit breakers
and analogous strategies need to be put in place [61]. Local energy
power generators and uninterruptible power systems (UPS) [76] can be
taken into account as indicators of backup solutions, although they
might not be sufficient to cover the demand of essential infrastructures
such as hospitals.
With respect to water, inhabitants have to be able to access potable
water. Therefore, treatment of used water has to be made in order to be
potentially made drinkable again [61,77]. This relates also to the water
autonomy of the urban autonomy that has to be known prior to any
disruptions, as well as the aforementioned elements.
3.4. Infrastructures
Infrastructures are broadly classified as the physical and organiza-
tional assets, essential for the functional operation and connection of
elements inside and outside a defined system (i.e., urban centre). This
includes for instance: bridges, road assets, transportation networks and
tunnels. Moreover, some building regulations [78] classify specific
types of infrastructures (and structures) as “strategic”, meaning that
they play a key role in case of emergency. This category embeds for
example bridges, as well as environmental infrastructures such as
dykes. To this regard, tailored strategies, such as structural health
monitoring (SHM) [79], are usually employed to assess their conditions
over their service life in order to adapt maintenance strategies
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accordingly.
Real-time structural health monitoring particularly might con-
tribute to the prevention of secondary disasters triggered by the initial
failure of the infrastructure. For instance, dykes and water reservoirs
can fail after a seismic event leading to floods and putting at stake the
integrity of urban centres nearby. As also mentioned above, SHM
techniques can inform maintenance strategies contributing to sustain
the efficiency and safety of the infrastructural system. Therefore, the
maintenance regime plays a key role for the achievement of resilience,
as identified by previous research [28], including the frameworks
proposed by Field et al. [20] and Da Silva [19].
Service continuity of infrastructures is also achieved through re-
dundancy. A redundant system is in fact provided with additional ele-
ments that would be necessary to sustain its function, and hence be able
to maintain a minimum required level of functionality in case of failure.
It is then crucial to assess the level of connectivity provided by an in-
frastructural network for it to be reliable and resilient.
3.5. Emergency & rescue systems
Recovery is a vital portion of the resilience process and it is
achieved through the provision of an effective emergency network. This
has to include both services and infrastructures which all have to be
redundant [73] but also provide an efficient coverage of the territory in
order to avoid exposed areas. The whole set of indicators presented in
this section is highly dependent both on the urban structure and its
planning strategies but also entails a close adjustment of existing
buildings where they do not comply with safety regulations.
As an example, the spatial distribution of critical infrastructures
such as hospitals, encompasses a constant update and adjustment to
building and urban planning regulations to ensure the most efficient
service possible in case of disaster. Equally important is the access to
evacuation information and their availability in order to make people
aware of the location of potential shelters of safe spots. Emergency
evacuations plans have to be regularly revised and updated and these
information have to be as accessible as possible to the public. To this
regard, buildings such as schools and hospitals have to be steadily as-
sessed when the amount of users increase compared to the initial de-
sign, not to compromise potential evacuation strategies.
3.6. Economy
Financial aspects are key for building resilience and they can highly
affect the quality of the physical system. Specifically, the performance
of a building during and after a disaster is highly conditional on the
quality of the structure, which is itself dependent on the technologies in
place. Moreover, poor quality materials and structural systems are often
the primary cause of lack of performance.
Briguglio et al. [80] proved that the Gross Domestic Product is a
strong influencing indicator for the economic resilience of a country.
Evidence suggests that countries with a more consistent financial
availability are known to be more resilient in face of natural hazard
[80], even when potential international aids are available. In fact,
Greene et al. [81] pointed out that the GDP can be classified as a pointer
for quality standard of constructions, therefore resulting in poor resi-
lience in deprived economies. It is renowned that the poorest districts of
urban agglomerations are characterized by scarce construction quality.
This factor becomes extremely relevant in the context of megacities
(e.g., Mexico City) and villages in underdeveloped or developing
economies.
The availability of financial support to renovate a structure in order
to comply with updated regulations can improve and enhance building
resilience significantly. Similarly, assessing the quality of the building
in the immediate aftermath of a disaster can foster more effective re-
covery strategies, preventing further deterioration or damage increase.
Faster recovery times also allow people to be relocated more efficiently
and hence reduce discomfort and costs deriving from temporary ac-
commodations.
3.7. Land use & urban morphology
A suitable land use is widely acknowledged to contribute to resi-
lience when taking into account the urban development [19]. Popula-
tion density is also embodied as an indicator [20] given its influence on
an urban scale. However, this criterion alone would lead to mis-
understanding given the different impact that a hazard can have on
comparable densely populated cities, with varying levels of prepared-
ness and infrastructural robustness. Therefore, quantifiable parameters
are also embedded to gather an accurate characterization of the urban
fabric in terms of building heights, zoning and development pattern.
Urban density is recognized in the literature [81] as a significant
indicator which can help clarify the correlation between population
density and specific building typologies, therefore informing the var-
iation in population distribution throughout the urban complex. In fact,
population density is usually measured as an average value, hence
“flattening” potential fluctuations to a unique number. The latter is
however not representative of the effective distribution of the in-
habitants of an urban centre (e.g., metropolises). Loo and Ong [82]
strengthen this view, maintaining that population density can sig-
nificantly vary from one urban area to another. To this regard, the
authors [82] suggest to address the index specifically to differentiate
between highly dense residential areas, suburban or business areas.
In addition, from an urban perspective, it is also relevant to un-
derstand how these densities (i.e., population and building) are physi-
cally spread over the land surface and in relation to time, since density
represents an average value assuming an even distribution over the
territory, which is unlikely to be the case in reality. In order to achieve
this, Marinosci et al. [83] analysed a set of 73 cities in the Italian ter-
ritory and, by means of GIS techniques they calculated several in-
dicators to represent the urban compactness (i.e., Largest Class Path
Index, LCPI), the tendency of urban boundaries to expansion, and the
diffusion of peripheral areas. Two more indicators have been taken into
account with regard to the urban dispersion phenomenon, namely the
dispersion index and the ratio between low-density areas and the
overall municipality boundaries. Based on these factors it has been
possible to devise a categorisation of urban structures in four main
typologies, namely: 1) Monocentric, 2) Monocentric with a tendency to
dispersion; 3) Diffuse urban structure; 4) Polycentric. A breakdown of
several types of urban structures is also provided by different re-
searchers [61,81,84], who identify four main urban patterns, namely:
rural-urban, boundary, sprawl and compact. On the other hand, a more
detailed approach has been adopted by Marinosci [83] who attempts to
highlight the urban structure based on the sprawl index.
In order to achieve a more thorough understanding of the urban
structure, there is a need to introduce the building density as an in-
dicator that can be achieved through the embodiment of a series of
factors herein described. A necessary differentiation between the di-
verse indexes involved in the urban domain has to be done, specifically
in relation to the Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and the Building Coverage
Ratio (BCR). The first accounts for the ratio between the overall sum-
mation of the building's floor surfaces over the related land area,
whereas the second represents the ratio between the external contour of
a building, as seen from the top, and the area of the site [85]. The FAR
reveals to be more representative in this context, providing an idea of
the volumetric occupation of the building, and not just its shape, as is
provided instead by the BCR. The latter, in fact, would imply just an
understanding of the overall coverage of the territory, while in this
context it is vital to acknowledge also the vertical distribution of the
urban stock. As a matter of fact, two land areas with the same extent
might show the same BCR index but completely different FAR because
the vertical extent of the buildings is different. In order to enrich the
dataset of information related to the buildings' height profile, Digital
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Surface Models (DSM) techniques can be employed.
4. Results and analysis
The Delphi expert consultation was carried out between November
2017 and August 2018, involving an initial panel of 70 experts tasked to
review 40 indicators. Two rounds were performed through an online
survey, in addition to a focus group meeting with project partners and a
trial round involving academics in the authors’ institution. The final set
of indicators involve 48 different criteria grouped into seven dimen-
sions. The final number of respondents is 23.
Table 6 summarises the dimensions selected for resilience assess-
ment with a breakdown of the results after the first and second round of
consultation. The following subsections describe how the indicators
have been modified based on the experts’ feedbacks, and elaborate on
the corresponding statistical analysis.
Prior to the detailed analysis, it is worth mentioning that the first
round outputs were processed with three different tools (i.e., MATLAB,
SPSS and Excel), as previously highlighted in section 3. MATLAB was
adopted for consistency reasons. The related research is presented in
section 2. The IQRs obtained with the three tools presented a dis-
crepancy of± 0.25 in relation to some of the criteria. The latter can be
justified by the different mathematical methods adopted by the soft-
ware that, combined with the small dimension of the dataset, lead to
higher discrepancy [86]. After the second round, the consensus rate
increased, with just 5 indicators deemed not satisfactory. The economic
category registered a significant surge both in terms of successful in-
dicators and consensus at the end of the survey, although resulting as
the weakest after the first round of consultation.
The first round was carried out using the online tool “Online
Survey” (formerly BOS), while for the second phase a dedicated excel
form was used. This was motivated by the need to provide a bespoke
form and given the impossibility of implementing previous rounds’
results in the Online Survey tool. This constraint would have prevented
the provision of the feedback. Therefore, the excel forms were custo-
mised for each expert, including: a) mean values for the whole re-
sponses; b) standard deviation for the total dataset; c) individual re-
sponse for the former round; d) IQR for the different criteria. The form
was also augmented with additional space for the experts to devise
modifications to the indicators or suggest new ones.
The indicators were differentiated according to three categories:
- Blue: New scoring not required in case the respondent did not
change opinion because the criterion did not undergo changes and
consensus has been achieved;
- Orange: New scoring required because the criterion has been up-
dated from the first round even though an acceptable level of con-
sensus has been achieved.
- Red: New scoring required as either consensus has not been
achieved or the indicator has been implemented just in the second
round.
The following sections provide the boxplots and statistical break-
down for the criteria included in each of the domains. The boxplot is
represented by a rectangle where the upper and lower sides correspond
respectively to the third and first quartiles, while the line contained in
the rectangle is the median value. The dashed lines end with whiskers
representing the maximum and minimum value of the dataset.
4.1. Environment
A first glance at Fig. 2 reveals that between the first and second
round there is an increase in the consensus and a general higher score
assignation to the different criteria. The dispersion of the dataset visible
from both Fig. 2 and Table 7 shows an improvement from round 1 to
round 2 since the height of the rectangles, including the extensions,
decreases. However, some criteria have been rephrased between the
two rounds in light of the experts’ opinions.
The first indicator has been judged confusing in the first formula-
tion, hence it has been rephrased in a more linear form. The potential
co-occurrence of more than one hazard has been considered significant.
Indicators from 2 to 10 in the first round have been pointed out as
significant especially when a hazard assessment is lacking. The authors
agree with the experts and to this regard, in section 3.1, a similar
specification has been pointed out regarding the adoption these in-
dicators in the absence of a hazard assessment. The “scenario
Table 6
Summary of results.
Dimension Round 1 Round 2
Total
criteria
Successful
criteria
% Total
criteria
Successful
criteria
%
Environment 12 8 67 13 11 85
Governance &
Planning
4 2 50 4 4 100
Utility Services 8 8 100 10 9 90
Infrastructures 3 3 100 4 3 75
Emergency &
Planning
4 4 100 4 4 100
Economy 4 1 25 7 6 86
Land use & urban
morphology
5 4 80 6 6 100
Overall 40 30 75 48 43 90
Fig. 2. Environmental boxplots after the first (a) and second (b) rounds of consultation.
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probability” has been considered inaccurate in its formulation. It has
hence been rephrased specifying the reference to the return period.
Indicators 6 and 7 in the first round have not been recognized as re-
levant for resilience, and particularly in relation to the “geotechnical
awareness of the area” (i.e., 7) where the consensus has not been
achieved through the second round. Some experts argued that the
geotechnical awareness is more significant throughout the design phase
rather for resilience enhancement. However, a suitable geotechnical
awareness of the area can help inform mitigation and prevention stra-
tegies, in addition to address vulnerability reduction in specific areas
known for being prone to hazards.
Indicators 8–10 were considered as hazard and site-specific but over
the second round the experts achieved an agreement in relation to an
average importance. Indicators such as 6, 8, 9, and 10 registered a
considerably lower score compared to the other indicators, which is
surprising considering the impact that these environmental factors can
have on buildings' durability and stability. However, the experts
pointed out that these factors, particularly “local environmental fac-
tors” (i.e., 6) and exposure to snow and wind (i.e., 9 and 10), are
meaningful over a design phase, similarly to the observations for in-
dicator 7. However, it is argued that it would be possible to enhance the
structures' resilience by acting on more effective maintenance strategies
where potentially dangerous environmental conditions are found (e.g.,
chlorides, pollutants). The “general climatic type” has been im-
plemented in the second phase following experts’ feedback but a weak
agreement has been reached in relation to its scarce importance. The
relevance attributed to the potential presence of hazardous industrial
areas (i.e., criterion 12) was rather low and surprising, considering the
lessons learnt from Fukushima and the disaster chain that characterized
that catastrophe.
4.2. Governance & planning
This category showed little success over the first phase whereas a
stronger consensus and overall higher scores have been obtained in the
second round, as illustrated in Fig. 3 and Table 8. The scale of hazard
management strategies sustained a high score throughout the two
rounds, whereas the “level of compliance to existing regulatory land-
scape” showed a higher disagreement in the second round. This in-
dicator has been considered meaningful and experts commented that its
relevance is highly conditional on the quality of the existing regulations
in terms of hazard mitigation. Indicators 15 has been rephrased for the
second round into “presence of monitoring and data collection” as this
formulation allows to also include early warning strategies. This change
is reflected in a higher score even if the standard deviation shows a
considerably spread range of opinions around this indicator. This is
surprising given the impact that early warning systems have on hazard
management and maintenance strategies, especially in relation to CIs
such as bridges. Real time monitoring of landslide-prone gullies, for
instance, can enhance preventive strategies and more effective eva-
cuation plans can be devised to promptly rescue the population when
the hazard is expected. The indicator addressing education and training
strategies has been deleted. Although some experts pointed out that the
criterion is important, there is disagreement about its utility in the
context of built environment resilience assessment.
4.3. Utility services
Utility services appear to be one of the most successful categories
registering considerable improvements from one round to the other in
terms of score and compactness of the dataset, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
All the indicators scored more than 4 apart from the “separation of used
water into grey and black flow” which achieved 3.38 in the second
round. The experts argued however that cross-contamination can es-
calate the impact of a hazard at the city scale. Table 9 shows that the
average score is high for all the criteria and in particular the “vulner-
ability of energy supply network”, which registered an outstanding
result with 4.83 and the lowest level of dispersion of the whole cate-
gory. The vulnerability assessment of energy supply networks plays a
crucial role especially in the aftermath of a disaster. It is hence im-
portant that potential faults are detected as they occur. This indicator
has been introduced in the second round based on experts’ suggestions
Table 7
Environmental criteria consensuses, *(IQR): interquartile range.
First round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
1 Single hazard (e.g., flood, earthquake, landslide, tsunami) vs multiple hazard occurrence (e.g., flood-earthquake, landslides- earthquake,
earthquake- tsunami)
4.18 0.795 1
2 Geographical scale of hazard(s) (e.g., local, regional, territorial) 4.18 0.958 1
3 Intensity of hazard(s) 4.82 0.395 0
4 Scenario probability (i.e., likelihood of occurrence of a specific disruptive condition)/identification of the most probable scenario 4.23 0.869 1.75
5 Site location (e.g., altitude, urban or country area, flat or mountainous site) 4.32 0.780 1
6 Local environmental factors (e.g., pollution, chemical aggressiveness, vibrations) 3.23 0.685 1
7 Geotechnical awareness of the area (e.g., drill cores, investigations, maps) 3.36 0.902 1
8 Ground typology (e.g., classification according Eurocodes) 2.91 0.971 2
9 Level of exposure to snow (according to Eurocodes) 2.50 0.859 1
10 Class of exposure to wind and terrain category (according to Eurocodes) 3.00 0.976 1.75
11 Level of engineering alterations with potential impact on the soil properties (e.g., mines, deforestation, fuel extraction) 3.36 0.902 1
12 Presence of hazardous industrial areas (e.g., nuclear plants) 3.77 1.307 2.75
Second Round
1 Number and specific typology of hazard(s) simultaneously occurring in the disaster scenario 4.33 0.730 1
2 Geographical scale of hazard(s) (e.g., local, regional, territorial) 4.24 0.831 1
3 Intensity/magnitude of hazard(s) 4.52 0.680 1
4 Hazard return period 4.10 0.831 1
5 Site location (e.g., altitude, urban or country area, flat or mountainous site) 4.29 0.644 1
6 Local amplification and environmental factors (e.g., pollution, chemical aggressiveness, vibrations) 3.10 0.831 0.25
7 Geotechnical awareness of the area (e.g., drill cores, investigations, maps) 3.86 1.153 2
8 Soil typology (e.g., classification according Eurocodes) 3.50 1.118 1
9 Level of exposure to snow (according to Eurocodes) 2.95 0.805 0.5
10 Class of exposure to wind and terrain category (according to Eurocodes) 3.19 0.602 1
11 Level of engineering alterations with potential impact on the soil properties (e.g., mines, deforestation, fuel extraction) 3.57 0.746 1
12 Presence of hazardous industrial areas for potential disaster chain occurrence (e.g., nuclear plants) 3.86 1.014 2
13 General climatic type according to Köppen classification (e.g., continental, temperate, tropical) 2.46 0.660 1
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as well as the “integrity and connectivity of telecommunication and
energy supply networks”. This is motivated by the need of relying on
well-connected and stable communication systems that can perform
even in face of a disruption, enhancing the recovery process and fa-
cilitating the rescuing measures.
4.4. Infrastructures
In Table 10 and Fig. 5, it is visible how the current category displays
a series of criteria which scored considerably high, ranging from 3.95 in
the first round to 4.63 in the second one. The indicator representing the
level of maintenance registered a lower score than anticipated in the
second round, while having the lowest assigned importance for both
phases. As discussed in the previous sections, maintenance plays a key
role in CIs' performance under external disruptions. Besides, structures
are subjected to degradation over time and in order to preserve their
performance an effective and regular maintenance is vital. An addi-
tional indicator (i.e., 31) has been implemented in accordance with the
suggestions provided by some of the experts’. It is indeed relevant to
take into account the accessibility to infrastructures in order to foster
recovery and allow a smooth intervention for emergency rescue ser-
vices.
4.5. Emergency & rescue systems
As it can be observed from Table 11, the indicators between the two
rounds remain unchanged, as well as the dispersion and consensus of
the dataset. Given that the discrepancies between the two rounds is
very small, there is no visible difference in the two boxplots of Fig. 6. In
this phase, some experts argued that the availability of contingency
plans (i.e., criterion 31 in round 1) refers more to a community resi-
lience assessment rather than a building-related one. However, ele-
ments such as evacuation strategies and traffic management are tightly
related to the recovery of buildings. In fact, the smoother is the eva-
cuation process the easier for example the fire brigade can intervene
and extinguish a fire, thus avoiding the complete collapse of a structure.
The spatial distribution of CIs has been judged considerably relevant in
relation to the coordination of post-immediate response and recovery,
in agreement with several experts’ feedbacks.
4.6. Economy
This category showed contrasting feedbacks after the first round. In
fact, it has been significantly modified for the second phase of con-
sultation, as evidenced in Table 12. Fig. 7 illustrates how the first three
criteria show coherence between the two rounds and the assigned re-
levance ranges in the final round between 4.05 and 4.62. However, the
indicator addressing financial support for disaster post-response (i.e.,
34 in the first round) registered a higher level of disagreement over the
second round as well as a higher dispersion.
There is a strong level of consensus in relation to the moderately low
relevance of factors such as the GDP, even though it is known that
wealthier countries have more margin to invest in performing struc-
tures and can provide more resources to boost the recovery process. The
presence of Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) and the avail-
ability of foreign aids represent an additional criterion pointed out by
Fig. 3. Governance & planning boxplots after the first (a) and second (b) rounds of consultation.
Table 8
Governance & planning criteria consensuses, *(IQR): interquartile range.
First round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
13 Scale of hazard governance strategy (e.g., flood prevention strategies at local, regional and national level) 4.61 0.739 1
14 Level of compliance to existing regulatory landscape 3.86 0.640 0.75
15 Presence of data sensing and acquisition for hazard forecasting 3.91 1.342 2
16 Education (from elementary or secondary school), training and communication 4.05 0.999 1.75
Second round
14 Scale of hazard governance strategy for hazard prevention and recovery (i.e., post-disaster reconstruction) 4.43 0.746 1
15 Effectiveness of previous disaster governance strategies 4.75 0.500 0.5
16 Level of compliance to existing regulatory landscape 3.76 0.831 1
17 Presence of monitoring and data collection (i.e., early warning systems) 4.13 1.170 1
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some of the experts and considered vital especially for countries that
cannot rely internally on significant financial funds. The lowest score
has been registered for the criterion addressing the different types of
industries able to support the local economy, which was assigned 3.21
in the second round with the experts agreeing on its low relevance for
this research context. However, the implementation of this indicator
was motivated by the feedback received from the first round, high-
lighting the need for an indicator taking into account the drivers of the
local economy.
4.7. Land use & urban morphology
Table 13 shows how the indicators between the first and second
round remained unchanged apart from the implementation of the cri-
terion addressing the prevailing land use, which has been highlighted
thanks to the experts’ feedback. However, this criterion scored just 3.71
on average in the second round, with a considerably general agreement
given the IQR of 0.5. Overall, Fig. 8 displays a significant improvement
in the level of consensus and compactness of the dataset. This category
is not considered by the experts to be particularly influencing for the
resilience of the built environment apart from population density,
which is the only indicator scoring more than 4 in both rounds with a
stable level of agreement.
However, urban indexes such as the ones represented by the criteria
38, 39 and 40 (i.e., 45, 46 and 47 in the second round) provide a
tangible, measurable and practical characterization of the city land-
scape. This consequently informs the urban-scale distribution of dif-
ferent types of buildings, allowing a more comprehensive under-
standing of the underlying vulnerabilities. This observation also applies
to the urban fabric criterion, which appears to not contribute to the
enhancement of resilience in the experts’ view.
4.8. Termination criteria of the delphi process
As anticipated in section 3.1.3, Dajani et al. [56] classify as a ter-
mination option the achievement of stability in combination with the
consensus target fulfilment. Stability is defined as the statistical con-
sistency between two values for the same variables across two rounds of
the consultation. In order to be quantitatively assessed, the metho-
dology devised by English and Kernan is adopted [57]. In section 3.1.3,
the methodology devised by English and Kernan [57] has been in-
troduced in reference to the work by Dajani et al. [56]. Based on the
values of mean and standard deviation, the variation coefficient has
been calculated and its trend is presented in Fig. 9. The line
Fig. 4. Utility services boxplots after the first (a) and second (b) rounds of consultation.
Table 9
Utility services criteria consensuses, *(IQR): interquartile range.
First round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
17 Level of energy autonomy (e.g., backup energy sources, stocks of energy) 4.41 0.666 1
18 Operational system protection (e.g., system relief, circuit breakers) 4.05 0.653 0
19 Diversification of energy supply (e.g., fuel mix, multi-sourcing, type of generation) 4.05 0.785 1
20 Level of functional redundancy (i.e., the ability of functionally similar elements to partly or fully substitute for each other) 4.05 0.999 1
21 Level of water autonomy (e.g., reservoir capacity, water supply network capacity) 4.59 0.503 1
22 Separation of used water into grey and black flows 3.41 0.908 1
23 Level of waste water discharge capability (e.g., soil absorption, green or grey infrastructures) 3.55 1.011 1
24 Diversity and redundancy of telecommunication systems (e.g., cable internet lines, wireless technologies, satellite) 4.27 0.827 1
Second round
18 Level of energy autonomy (e.g., backup energy sources, stocks of energy) 4.52 0.602 1
19 Operational system protection (e.g., system relief, circuit breakers) 4.14 0.854 1
20 Diversification of energy supply (e.g., fuel mix, multi-sourcing, type of generation) 4.14 0.655 1
21 Level of functional redundancy (i.e., the ability of functionally similar elements to partly or fully substitute for each other) 4.19 0.680 1
22 Level of water autonomy (e.g., reservoir capacity, water supply network capacity) 4.43 0.598 1
23 Separation of used water into grey and black flows to avoid cross contamination 3.38 0.740 1
24 Level of waste water discharge capability (e.g., soil absorption, green or grey infrastructures) 3.43 0.811 1
25 Diversity and redundancy of telecommunication systems (e.g., cable internet lines, wireless technologies, satellite) 4.00 0.949 1.25
26 Vulnerability of energy supply network (e.g., gas pipes, water reservoirs) 4.83 0.289 0.375
27 Integrity and connectivity of telecommunication and energy supply networks 4.33 0.577 0.75
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representing the first round data set appears scattered in some points
because of the additional indicators implemented for the second phase.
The x axis contains the reference number for the criteria of the second
round, but the corresponding first-round criteria can be easily retrieved
in Tables 7–13 The dotted line represents the absolute difference be-
tween the variation coefficients between the two rounds.
English and Kernan establish that a variation coefficient between 0
and 0.5 is acceptable to consider consensus achieved and hence ter-
minate the process. Firstly, it has to be observed that overall the criteria
fulfils the requirement of stability and hence justify the termination
after two rounds. Fig. 6 displays a significant stability of the dataset,
registering a peak of variation of 0.151 for indicator 18 (i.e., 17 in the
first round), corresponding to “Level of energy autonomy (e.g., backup
energy sources, stocks of energy)”. The difference between the variation
coefficients has just been calculated for the common values, so the new
indicators have not been considered.
5. Discussion
Fig. 10 shows the final framework for urban resilience assessment
with the 48 criteria clustered into seven domains. The wind rose dia-
gram also summarises the mean value for each indicator according to
the results presented in Section 4, in line with the second round of
consultation. Overall, the majority of the indicators scored over 4
points, while a minority was rated between 3 and 4.
On the whole, a significant increase in the consensus rate has been
registered moving from one round to the other, raising the number of
satisfactory indicators for each round from 30 to 40 and 43 to 48, re-
spectively, with an overall success of about 90% after the second round.
However, five indicators did not meet the consensus criteria, while two
Table 10
Infrastructural criteria consensuses, *(IQR): interquartile range.
First round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
25 Presence of structural health monitoring systems of critical infrastructures (e.g., reservoirs, dams) 4.36 0.902 1
26 Connectivity level of transportation networks (e.g., railway stations, airports) 4.32 0.716 1
27 Level of maintenance regime of public infrastructures 4.05 0.722 0.75
Second round
28 Presence of structural health monitoring systems of critical infrastructures (e.g., reservoirs, dams) 4.33 0.856 1
29 Connectivity level of transportation networks (e.g., railway stations, airports) 4.33 0.796 1
30 Level of maintenance regime of public infrastructures 3.95 0.973 1.25
31 Accessibility and transport network proximity to emergency services 4.63 0.644 0.75
Fig. 5. Infrastructures boxplots after the first (a) and second (b) rounds of consultation.
Table 11
Emergency & rescue services criteria consensuses, *(IQR): interquartile range.
First round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
28 Redundancy of critical infrastructures (e.g., hospitals) 4.45 0.671 1
29 Spatial distribution of critical infrastructures 4.32 0.716 1
30 Emergency communications, access to warning systems and evacuation information 4.64 0.581 1
31 Availability and update of contingency plans (e.g., evacuation strategies, traffic management) 4.41 0.666 1
Second round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
32 Redundancy of critical infrastructures (e.g., hospitals) 4.48 0.750 1
33 Spatial distribution of critical infrastructures 4.24 0.700 1
34 Emergency communications, access to warning systems and evacuation information 4.52 0.680 1
35 Availability and update of contingency plans (e.g., evacuation strategies, traffic management) 4.38 0.740 1
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scored less than 3 hence deemed not relevant. As it can be observed in
Table 6, three dimensions reached a satisfactory level of consensus,
while four of them presented two (i.e., environment) or one un-
satisfactory indicator (i.e., infrastructure, utility services and economy).
The criteria which have not been judged as important to enhance
resilience in the built environment belong to the environmental domain
and consist in the level of exposure to snow and the general climatic
type. It is acknowledged that the common view of the experts is against
the involvement of these indicators for two main reasons: (a) the two
factors are usually accounted in the design phase, so some experts
Fig. 6. Emergency & rescue services boxplots after the first (a) and second (b) rounds of consultation.
Table 12
Economy criteria consensuses, *(IQR): interquartile range.
First round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
32 Availability of post-disaster financial assessment 4.05 0.785 1.75
33 Availability of financial support to comply with existing regulations (e.g., structural interventions to comply to new building regulations) 3.95 0.785 2
34 Availability of financial support for immediate post-crisis response (e.g., governmental, insurance coverage, contingency funds) 4.68 0.568 0.75
35 Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 3.27 1.032 1.75
Second round
36 Availability of post-disaster financial assessment 4.05 0.740 1.25
37 Availability of local financial support to comply with existing regulations (e.g., structural interventions to comply to new building regulations) 4.12 0.705 1
38 Availability of financial support for immediate post-crisis response (e.g., governmental, insurance coverage, contingency funds) 4.62 0.669 1
39 Mixture of resources available for post-crisis response (e.g., partly supplied by government, partly underwritten by insurance) 3.83 1.115 1
40 Country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and its influence on prevention and recovery 3.48 0.928 1
41 Presence of NGOs and capability of using foreign aid 3.42 0.793 1
42 Classification of industrial structures and type that support local economy 3.21 1.157 0.75
Fig. 7. Economy category boxplots after the first (a) and second (b) rounds of consultation.
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argued about the redundancy of this indicators, and (b) other comments
involved the overlapping of these information with the hazard assess-
ment. However, as thoroughly observed in section 4 in relation to the
environmental criteria, the indicators in section 1 have to be considered
as a substitute of the hazard assessment in case the latter is not present.
With respect to the geotechnical awareness of the area, a relatively low
score was registered and this is rather surprising as a suitable awareness
of the soil and its investigation is crucial to ensure the correct level of
stability and reliability of the superstructure. However, it is believed
that the experts might have considered this indicator more impacting in
the design phase than for a potential resilience assessment. The authors
however argue about the relevance of this indicator throughout all the
considered phases, as for both existing buildings and new structures,
soil awareness is one of the main factors requiring investigation in an
early stage of analysis.
It is worth noting that the criterion dealing with the potential
Table 13
Land use & urban morphology criteria consensuses, *(IQR): interquartile range.
First round Mean St.Dev. IQR*
36 Urban fabric and development pattern 3.45 0.963 1
37 Population density (i.e., concentration of people per square kilometre) 4.41 0.590 1
38 Floor area ratio (FAR) on an urban scale (i.e., ratio between the sum of the buildings' floor surfaces and the urban centre area) 3.68 0.839 1
39 Building coverage ratio (BCR) on an urban scale (i.e., ratio between the sum of building external footprints and the urban area) 3.68 0.945 1.75
40 Buildings' height profile (e.g., Digital Surface Models techniques) 3.32 0.995 1
Second round
43 Urban fabric and development pattern 3.33 0.796 1
44 Population density (i.e., concentration of people per square kilometre) 4.38 0.669 1
45 Floor area ratio (FAR) on an urban scale (i.e., ratio between the sum of the buildings' floor surfaces and the urban centre area) 3.71 0.845 1
46 Building coverage ratio (BCR) on an urban scale (i.e., ratio between the sum of building external footprints and the urban area) based on satellite
imageries and GIS techniques
3.69 0.814 1
47 Buildings' height profile (e.g., Digital Surface Models techniques) 3.52 1.167 1
48 Predominant Land use/type 3.71 0.916 0.5
Fig. 8. Land use & urban morphology boxplots after the first (a) and second (b) rounds of consultation.
Fig. 9. Variation coefficients for the criteria over the two rounds of consultation.
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presence of hazardous industrial areas was part of the group of criteria
that did not meet the consensus threshold, even after the second round,
despite the importance of this criterion in assessing the risk of en-
gendering a disaster chain. The geotechnical awareness of the area
registered a lower level of consensus over the second round, and this is
probably due to the experts’ assessment of it being more a design
parameter rather than a resilience enhancement criterion. In addition,
diversity and redundancy of telecommunication systems registered
some disagreement considering that the calculated consensus rate is
1.25. Similarly, the maintenance regime of CIs scored 3.95 while re-
gistering an insufficient consensus level of 1.25.
By the end of the second round, the availability of immediate post-
disaster financial assessment registered also an unsuitable 1.25
consensus level but an average score of 4.05. In the work by Alshehri
[21], the insurance coverage-related indicator scored instead 3.75 with
a satisfactory consensus level of 1 in a 5-Likert scale. However, it has to
be pointed out that the post-disaster damage assessment for a financial
perspective is of particular relevance for insurance coverage [21],
therefore boosting the recovery process and the prioritization of re-
construction planning activities. Insurance coverage is accounted as an
influencing criterion also in the framework by Da Silva [19]. It is ac-
knowledged that most private households could be uninsured or in-
formation might not be available. However, the weight of this criterion
becomes significant when dealing with public-owned buildings and
infrastructures (e.g., schools, hospitals, road networks).
It is worth highlighting the relevance of the maintenance regime
Fig. 10. Final framework for urban-scale resilience assessment.
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criterion for all the frameworks reviewed in section 3 [19,20], and
specifically for the one proposed by Labaka regarding CIs resilience
[26]. This not only applies to preventive strategies but also to the
structure's robustness. Given that the latter is broadly defined as the
ability of the element to provide an adequate resistance when subjected
to a certain level of stress [30], it is interesting to note how this relates
to the structure's immediate response to a disruption.
6. Conclusions and future work
The framework presented in the paper is part of a comprehensive
conceptualization of buildings' resilience factoring in two scales of
analysis, namely macro and micro, as anticipated in the work by Cerè
et al. [1]. In this context, a framework for the qualitative assessment of
resilience of buildings in face of geo-environmental hazards has been
devised. Resilience is a multifaceted concept, characterized by different
dimensions, identified through an in-depth review of several existing
frameworks for resilience assessment. A wider review allowed to devise
a set of indicators which have been assessed through the adoption of the
Delphi consultation methodology. The results of the two rounds of
consultation have been herein presented and analysed in light of the
experts’ feedbacks and values of the relevant statistical parameters (i.e.,
mean, standard deviation and interquartile range).
The results show an overall increase in both consensus and com-
pactness of the experts’ opinion which has been registered throughout
the two rounds. The final set includes 43 satisfactory indicators with 5
more showing an insufficient consensus rate. The criteria are grouped
in seven dimensions, ranging from environmental factors, to financial
and technical domains, in order to adopt a holistic approach that ac-
counts for all the relevant aspects characterizing the resilience of the
built environment.
The authors argue that the strength of the proposed framework,
compared to existing ones, lies in its focussed scope. In fact, when the
resilience assessment is too broad and attempts to embrace a wide
range of aspects, these tend to suffer from information inconsistency
and a lack of accuracy. Another advantage of the proposed metho-
dology is its practical applicability through quantifiable indicators. The
comprehensive structure of this framework and its scalable usability
bridges the gap between existing methodologies targeting either single
buildings structurally (i.e., micro scale) or entire cities from a com-
munity perspective (i.e., macro scale). Additionally, the proposed
methodology allowed to gather experts’ feedback from different pro-
fessional and academic backgrounds, hence approaching the research
from different standpoints.
Because of its nature and its unicity, the framework now encompasses
the resilience of the physical system in face of geo-environmental hazard,
namely buildings and infrastructures. However, future work could in-
tegrate further disciplines (e.g., social features) while preserving the
double-scale (i.e., macro and micro) approach, which forms the main
innovation of this strategy. Moreover, further work would benefit also
from the use of an analytical hierarchy process (AHP) analysis in order to
appropriately weight the criteria and make the framework usable in real-
world situations. This forms the focus of our future work which also
includes gathering relevant pre and post-disruption satellite imagery, to
instantiate the framework using a case study area located in Old
Beichuan County in the Sichuan province (China) [87], to assess the
resilience of the site in relation to the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake. The
latter will be reported in a follow-on publication.
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